OTTOMAN HISTORY

The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1730

Course Description
Designed with English-speaking students in mind, this course will cover some of the major issues about the Ottoman Empire from the beginning till 1730. Among the many subjects that we will examine are the theories on the rise of the Ottomans in world history, the transformation from humble nomadic backgrounds to sedentary social and political structures, the Ottoman "holy wars," the conquest of Constantinople and the definitive establishment of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman military successes and expansion strategies, the "Golden Age," the scholarly debates regarding the Ottoman "decline," the social and political interactions with the West, the "Age of Tulips," the Ottoman state institutions and structure, women and sovereignty and the political power of the Ottoman harem, and the secular and religious laws of the Ottoman Empire.

About the Professor
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Unit VII	Religious and Secular Laws: The Ottoman Way

Required Texts

- Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991.

- Colin Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997.

- Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire: 1300-1650*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

- Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.

- Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600,* trans. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973.

- Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

- Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.

- Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*. Indiana University, Uralic and Altaic Series, Volume 144. Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1983.

- Leslie P. Pierce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

- Ariel Salzmann, "The Age of Tulips: Confluence and Conflict in Early Modern Consumer Culture (1550-1730)" in *Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550-1922: An Introduction,* Donald Quataert, ed. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000, pp. 83-106.

- Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*. London: Luzac, 1938.

Historical Overview:

Rising around 1300 in Northwestern Anatolia and becoming the most significant world power by the time of Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), the Ottoman Empire was what is called today the "Middle East" and beyond.

Many theories have been put forth to explain the birth and the development of the Ottoman military supremacy, bureaucracy, social and economic institutions, and ethnic structure. Who were the Ottomans? Was the House of Osman (the presumed founder of the state) comprised of "Turks" only? Was the Ottoman state a direct continuation of the Anatolian Seljuk dynasty or a transformation of it under new leadership? Were significant elements from the Byzantine institutions carried over into the Ottoman structure? What was the role of religious conversions in the creation of such a military and economic power? Was jihad the sole and only inspiration of the Ottomans in their military successes? How "Islamic" and pious were these rulers and their state? How did the Ottoman rulers manage to keep their multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual populations largely in peace for centuries? How did the Ottoman state based so predominantly on the rules and values of sedentary life accommodate or fail to accommodate the nomadic Turks who in the beginning had contributed to the very creation of it? Was a secular world view so foreign to the minds of the Ottomans? Needless to say, no single introduction can provide a fully detailed and satisfactory answer to all these questions. Yet, we will attempt to historicize and contextualize these significant issues in order to arrive at a more meaningful comprehension of the subject at hand.

The foundation of the Great Seljuk dynasty was the result of a confederation of Turkic-speaking tribes conquering Iran, leading to the occupation of Baghdad in 1055. These tribes changed not only the political but also the ethnic structure of the Middle East. The 1071 Battle of Manzikert (Malazgirt) in eastern Anatolia was one of the major outcomes of this dynasty and it marked a turning point for Anatolian Turkish history. There the Great Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan (1063-1072) defeated the Byzantine Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes (ruled 1068-1071) thus preparing the beginning of the collapse of the Byzantine power in eastern and central Anatolia. Almost a decade later the Turks had already reached the Marmara Sea in northwestern Anatolia and started the foundation of the Anatolian Seljuk dynasty (the Seljuks of Rum). The Byzantine crush in 1071 was followed by deeper and frequent holy and unholy raids into Asia Minor and before the end of the eleventh century Anatolia was divided and controlled by the political and military powers of various small Turkish principalities, Armenian princes, Byzantine chiefs, and the Crusaders.[1] The Anatolian Seljuk Turks dominated the region until 1308, fighting both the Byzantine dynasty and the Crusaders in the west, and the Mongols in the east.

Little is known about the details of the rise of the Ottoman State. In addition to the legendary and folkloric explanations found in manuscripts, such as Osman the holy warrior's dream, most of our knowledge of the earliest Ottomans and their creation narrative comes from a court poet named Ahmedi (d. 1412). His poem entitled "History of the Kings of the Ottoman Lineage and Their Holy Raids against the Infidels" is the foundation text for the study of the rise of the Ottoman state and its ideology. Virtually every scholarly work dealing with the subject refers to his versified account of the early Ottomans. Even though the work treats only a limited period of the Ottoman dynastic history, from Ertugrul to Emir Süleyman, its importance derives from the fact that it is the oldest annalistic account of Ottoman history that has come down to us. Because those earliest Ottomans left no accounts of themselves, the poet Ahmedi's work became the key source—though almost always without a proper reading of the text—for subsequent theories regarding the social and political structure of the earliest Ottomans. Ahmedi's poem may be viewed as a

religious epic that manifestly glorifies the sacrifice made by the Muslim Ottoman warrior on the path of God. Regardless of whether these earliest militant engagements actually served a specific religious ideology or not, Ahmedi's text nonetheless strives to construct a historical memory about them that requires a religious justification. However, any attempt to explain the rise of the Ottoman state solely as a result of a "holy war" enterprise is destined to fail if it is based on the assumption that the poet's work is an objective and factual record of those events. One abiding example of its importance is that Ahmedi's work has been cited in support of contradictory interpretations of the concepts of *jihad* that provide the fuel for debate between Western and Turkish researchers. The work serves as the fundamental reference both for those who maintain that the political expansion of the Ottomans was the outcome of a "holy war" against the "infidel," and for those who consider the conduct of the Ottomans to have been contrary to any religious ideology of Islam. It was Paul Wittek who first argued that "from the first appearance of the Ottomans, the principal factor in this political tradition was the struggle against their Christian neighbors, and this struggle never ceased to be of vital importance to the Ottoman Empire."[2] This view also was embraced by perhaps the most influential historian of the Ottoman Empire, Halil İnalcık: "At the time of its foundation at the turn of the fourteenth century," he says "the Ottoman state was a small principality on the frontiers of the Islamic world, dedicated to... the holy war against infidel Christianity."[3] However, decades after Wittek had established this "struggle" or "Holy War" interpretation, Rudi Paul Lindner proposed a new hypothesis that "... the Holy War played no role in early Ottoman history, despite the later claims of Muslim propagandists."[4] Pál Fodor, using Ahmedi's history as his basic source, maintained a similar view of the role of "Holy War" in the early Ottoman state, saying "[it] contains concrete references to the effect that the ideas of... [holy war] are the products of later interpretations."[5] Cemal Kafadar argued in support of Lindner's earlier opposition to the so-called Holy War theory.[6] *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* by Heath W. Lowry is perhaps the most sophisticated and thoroughly researched presentation of the role that "Holy War" played in the construction of the Ottoman state.[7] Here, Lowry strongly opposes the "Holy War" approach and proposes that Wittek's theory be laid to rest.

For these early Ottomans, the fourteenth century was the century of ideological formation and the development of conquest strategies. The conquests of Bursa (1326), İznik (1331), and Edirne (1361) were most significant since they also prepared the military way towards Constantinople and the Balkans. As they transformed their small principality into a rising state in the northwestern part of Anatolia, their earliest nomadic elements were rapidly being replaced by the values and realities of sedentarization.

During the time of Murad I (1362-1389) and Bayezid I (1389-1402) this process of transformation gained strength by the creation of the Janissary army and it demonstrates the fact that there was a diminishing need for the nomads in the Ottoman army. Also the early stages of "a land and census registry suggest a concern that all the Ottoman subjects be settled, easily located, and thus easily taxable."[8] While it meant the gradual elimination of the nomadic Turks from the Ottoman state-building experience, the formation of the Janissary army during the reigns of these two rulers played a crucial role in the military and political domination of the Ottoman Empire in the subsequent centuries. Janissary, or in Turkish *Yeni Çeri,* means the "New Soldier" or "New Army." The *devshirme* (recruiting of Christian boys for the Janissary army) and the directly related concept of the Janissary corps institution were perhaps the most important offshoots of the Ottoman slavery system. In the early stages of it, non-Muslim Janissary units were comprised of prisoners of war who were given to the sultans as the "one-fifth share of the booty allowed... by religious law."[9] In later centuries the Janissary army was created by forcefully collecting young "infidel" boys from their families and training them in the Ottoman way, a social and cultural transformation, or the process of Ottomanization. As

Niyazi Berkes rightfully suggests, the Janissary institution was one of the three foremost strategies that protected the Sultan's absolute authority from division.[10] In terms of the full details of this practice of slavery and human transformation, and the Ottoman logic behind it, there remains much to be researched.

After Bayezid I was defeated and taken captive by Timur (Timurlenk, Timur the Lame) at the Battle of Ankara in 1402, a civil war broke out between Bayezid I's sons (Süleyman, Musa, Mustafa, Isa, and Mehmed I). This brief era of chaos and interruption is known in Turkish history as the "interregnum" (1402-1413). If Timur had not died in 1405, the entire course of Turkish history in Anatolia would have been changed, and "the Ottoman state could well have disintegrated completely."[11] After the death of Timur, Bayezid I's sons fought for the succession of the Ottoman sultanate resulting in Mehmed I's ascending to the Ottoman throne (1413-1421). Mehmed I's success was the beginning of a significant Ottoman recovery from a military and political disaster, and in a very short time period, the Ottoman state was reestablished its powerful position in Europe and Anatolia. Murad II's sovereignty (1421-1451) not only reestablished Ottoman military domination in the Balkans, but it also significantly boosted its economic development. "In 1432 the traveller Bertrandon de la Brocquière noted that Ottoman annual revenue had risen to 2,500,000 ducats, and that if Murad II had used all available resources he could easily have invaded Europe."[12]

Bayezid I's ambitions and Murad II's military and economic accomplishments paved the way to Mehmed II (1451-1481) and his extraordinary achievement of conquering the city of Constantinople in 1453. The city was held under siege for 54 days. Ottoman forces outnumbered the defenders by almost five to one but their victory was sealed by the use of canons, greater than any ever used before. This technological upper hand allowed them to storm the city's walls which were considered the strongest fortifications of the Middle Ages. The conquest of Constantinople permanently attached the title "Conqueror (Fatih)" to Mehmed's name and it marked the beginning of the definitive establishment of the Ottoman Empire.[13] Before the conquest of Istanbul[14] the Ottomans had no capital city, thus the year 1453 also meant the official centralization of the Ottoman Empire.[15]

After the "holy warrior" Mehmed's death in 1481, the era of Bayezid II (1481-1512) emerged. One of the significant developments during his reign was the growth and strength of the Ottoman navy and this had important implications for the spread of the "holy war" ideology challenging Venice and Spain.[16] The Sunni "holy wars" reached their peak during the short period of Selim I (Yavuz Sultan Selim, 1512-1520). The Ottoman state was no longer a regional power in the Balkans and Anatolia but had become a world empire. With the defeat of Shah Ismail at the famed Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, the conquest of Diyarbakir and the defeat of Mamluks at Marj Dabik in 1516, and the capture of Egypt in 1517, the Ottomans not only expanded the territory of the empire to a significant degree but also began to play a major role as the leader of the Sunni world of Islam.[17]

Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566) continued his father's legacy of "holy wars" and territorial expansionism against both the Christian West and the Shiite Muslims in addition to advancing the Ottoman bureaucratic structure. Karen Barkey attributes the success of Süleyman the Magnificent to "his ability to balance the conception of a grand empire abroad with stability and cohesion at home."[18] The sultan managed to arrive at this balance via wars against the countries in the East and West beginning when he ascended to the throne, and his skill in strengthening the legal system. The capture of Belgrade in 1521, the conquest of Rhodes in 1522, and the expansionist battles against Hungary (1526 and 1541) and Iran (1553) were among the most significant military and political achievements of Süleyman the Magnificent. By 1566, "the Ottoman Empire had reached the comfortable

geographic limits of expansion."[19] In the literature set out to create and promote the ideal image of an emperor, Süleyman the Magnificent looked—among many other epithets— kindhearted, law-abiding, munificent, humble, balanced, intuitive, and just. He was praised for going against illegal and cruel acts towards the powerless social classes of the empire. He strengthened the Islamic canonical law with secular ones (*kânûn*s) he promulgated and perfected, thus gaining fame as Süleyman the Lawgiver. He was a stringent administrator of his own *kânûn*s. The mythical image of the sultan was that he was a "perfect ruler."[20] However, in the words of Cornell Fleischer, while the sultan "enjoy[ed] almost sacral status in Ottomanist literature," his administration was neither perfect nor orderly.[21] Süleyman was glorified by an inscription in his mosque as "the Propagator of the Sultanic Laws,"[22] but at the same time the Sultan struggled to establish a global Islamic unity through his supreme military might and believed in the unconditional rule of the *shari'a* (the Islamic canon law) in his own lands.[23] He was not only the creator and follower of man-made secular laws and regulations but acted as the shadow of God on earth, adopting the Islamic title of "Caliph."[24]

The seventeenth century Ottoman Empire was far from the "Golden Age" of Süleyman the Magnificent. The Ottoman political and military failure of the second siege of Vienna in 1683 and the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 resulted in devastating losses of territory. They had to withdraw from Transylvania and Hungary, adding a final blow to the overall distressed years of the seventeenth-century Ottoman "decline."[25] After this century of chaos, including the "sultanate" of a seven-year old child named Sultan Mehemmed IV (1648-1687), the chilling intrigues for power and control at the Ottoman palace, the emerging years of the eighteenth-century seemed somehow more promising, at least from cultural and philosophical points of view. The significant developments in the courtly lives and preoccupations of the eighteenth-century Ottomans was symbolized by a passion for tulips—an emblematic point of reference for the changes in the Ottoman high culture. As it was fashionably named in modern historiography, the Ottoman "Age of the Tulips"[26] (1718-1730) exhibited a "secular trend, which made Turkey seem like a country experiencing a renaissance."[27] The time period refers to one of the most colorful and remarkable eras of the Ottoman Empire. Chronologically speaking, it corresponds to the second half (1703-1730) of the reign of Sultan Ahmed III and more precisely to the thirteen years of İbrahim Paşa's viziership. It was characterized by a wish to realize "peace" after so many military conflicts and the visible drain they were making on the economy and overall energy of the empire. The rulers of the empire adopted a policy to avoid war at all cost, and the Ottomans began to look outside more, specifically to the West, for new cultural and economic inspiration. The "Age of the Tulips" has come to signify a time during which the Islamic East was bereft of what the Ottoman Turks required. By that time, the West had achieved a higher level of economic wealth, scientific progress, and military strength.[28] In the words of Bernard Lewis, "[t]he first deliberate attempt at a Westernizing policy—the first conscious step, that is, towards the imitation and adoption of certain selected elements from the civilization of Western Europe—came in the early eighteenth century."[29]

The immediate outcome of this Westernizing policy was an increase in Ottoman diplomatic missions. Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed Efendi was sent on a diplomatic mission to Paris in 1721. He was asked to investigate French technology and civilization. He not only observed the technological superiority of the French but brought a number of gifts from France, among them, plans and engravings of fancy gardens, especially those at Versailles and Marly-le-roi. These were then adapted for imitation, yielding the Frenchified water gardens at Kağıdhane on the Golden Horn.[30] During this period, the arts flourished in Istanbul. Sultan Ahmed and his vizier were very generous in supporting artists, architects, musicians, and men of poetry. The leading poets of the time frequently were invited by the sultan and the vizier to perform their poems, receiving gifts and donations in exchange for their

entertainment.[31] While economic conditions remained mostly unstable, the Ottoman palace still indulged in expensive pleasures, receiving direct support from its prodigal sultan and his vizier. During the viziership of İbrahim Paşa, a number of foreign architects were brought to Istanbul for the construction of the imperial pavilions. The famous pavilions in Kağıdhane were designed by French architects in Paris. Their plans were brought to Istanbul by Monsieur Lenoir, who was at that time an interpreter for the French embassy.[32]

Among the positive developments of Ahmed III's reign was the new interest in book collecting. The sultan, who was a poet and calligrapher himself, endowed a library building inside the Topkapı Palace in 1719. This library was significant because of the almost unprecedented effort to catalogue and arrange its manuscripts into classified sections.[33] The grand vizier also was a lover of books. He prohibited the export of rare manuscripts and later founded a center for the translation of Arabic and Persian texts. He himself established five libraries, in addition to that of Ahmed III. He was also influential in promoting other artistic activities, encouraging the manufacture of porcelain and earthenware, restoring the workshops of İzmit and Kütahya, and establishing a new workshop in Istanbul.[34]

From a technological point of view, the most significant development of the reign of Ahmed III was the introduction of moveable-type printing, almost three hundred years after its development in Europe. It was the most important technical innovation of the "Age of the Tulips," for the Ottoman Empire had enforced a ban on all printed books until this time. Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed and his son Said Çelebi played perhaps the most significant roles in the introduction of this innovation. Said Çelebi had accompanied his father on his journey to France and during his stay, he most likely had acquired an interest in printing. Although the Turks were aware of printing activities in Europe, they had never acquired this technical knowledge.[35] Upon returning to Turkey, he assisted the Grand Vizier in setting up an Ottoman printing press in Istanbul. İbrahim Müteferrika, a Hungarian convert to Islam, was put in charge of the project and later came to be known as the founder of the first Ottoman printing press.[36] There were different reactions to the setting up of printing presses from the religious conservatives and fanatics, scribes and calligraphers, who, naturally enough, saw printing as a threat to their vested interests. Şeyhülislam[37] Abdullah Efendi issued a *fetva*[38] authorizing the printing of books only on subjects other than religion. As Lewis remarks, "[t]he printing of the Koran, of books on Koranic exegesis, traditions, theology, and holy law was excluded as unthinkable."[39] It should be mentioned that there was also a "growing interest among the physicians of the period to apply scientific remedies to specific illnesses rather than clinging to the medieval theory of humors."[40]

The most significant and quite evident change in the eighteenth century was the weakening of the religious institution and its laws among the Ottoman elite. Although the social scope of the reforms of the "Age of the Tulips" was mostly limited to the upper-class coteries, these changes demonstrated a serious movement from within the imperial administration towards a secular society. Berkes describes indications of the weakening of religious authority and an evident laxity in the observation of traditional moral values in the eighteenth century even among the common people.[41]

The colorful "Age of the Tulips" came to an end with the 1730 rebellion which was led by Patrona Halil, an Albanian Janissary who had served in the Ottoman navy and formerly had been a second-hand clothes dealer. Patrona Halil had twelve men assisting him during the organization of the revolt. On September 28, they ran through the streets calling to every individual for support against the Ottoman ruling class. In a short time, the number of insurgents began to grow and Janissaries joined the group. Prisons were opened and the slaves of five galleys released. Their initial demand was the lives of five ministers. To save his own life, Ahmed III was ready to sacrifice three of his top advisers. On September 30,

the sultan ordered the strangling of his vizier, İbrahim Paşa, and his two sons-in-law. However, giving away these lives did not ensure the security of his throne; the rebels insisted on his abdication. On October 2, having received the guarantee that his life would be spared, Ahmed III abdicated and Mahmud I (1730-1754) ascended to the throne. In full contrast to the regime of Ahmed III, Mahmud I departed from what Ariel Salzmann calls the "gay processions to the gardens and palaces" and the new Sultan's "entourage solemnly prepared for a pilgrimage along the Golden Horn to the tomb of the Prophet's companion Eyüb."[42]

[1] Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire: 1300-1650* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 4-5; Emre Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye: 2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1999), p. 49; Carter Vaughn Findley, *The Turks in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 69; Ümit Hassan, "Siyasi Tarih: Açıklamalı Bir Kronoloji" in *Türkiye Tarihi 1: Osmanlı Devletine Kadar Türkler,* edited by Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995), pp. 173-179; Warren Treadgold, *A History of the Byzantine State and Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 600-601); Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 3.
[1] Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Luzac, 1938) p. 2.
[1] Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600,* trans. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 3.
[1] Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia.* Indiana University, Uralic and Altaic Series, Volume 144 (Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1983), p. 6.
[1] Pál Fodor, "Ahmedi's Dasitan as a Source of Early Ottoman History," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, XXXVIII, 1-2 (1984), p. 52.
[1] Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*.
[1] Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).
[1] Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia.* p. 51.
[1] Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 20-21.
[1] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), p. 14.
[1] İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age*, p. 17.
[1] İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age*, p. 22.
[1] İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age*, p. 23.
[1] "Istanbul," or in the Ottoman way of writing "Stambul," is not a Turkish name. It comes from the Medieval Greek word *is tin polin* ("into the city") and was used by the Ottomans simultaneously with the Arabicised *Konstantiniyye* (Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*, edited by William C. Hickman, translated from the German by Ralph Manheim [Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978], p. 102.)
[1] Metin Kunt, "Siyasal Tarih (1300-1600)" in *Türkiye Tarihi: Osmanlı Devleti, 1300-1600,* volume 2, edited by Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995), p. 80.
[1] Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition*, p. 30.
[1] Kunt, "Siyasal Tarih (1300-1600)," p. 120.
[1] Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 45.
[1] Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats,* p. 45.
[1] Halil İnalcık, "Sultan Süleyman: The Man and the Statesman" in *Soliman le Magnifique et son temps.* Publiés par Gilles Veinstein (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1992), p. 89.
[1] Cornell H. Fleischer, "The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign of Süleyman" in *Soliman le Magnifique et son temps*, p. 159.

[1] Halil İnalcık, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies Series, 1993), p. 85.

[1] İnalcık, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire,* p. 81.

[1] Süleyman the Magnificent's man in charge of the canonical religious affairs, Şeyhü'l-islam Ebu's-su'ud, was responsible in the formulation of the caliphate claim. However, Süleyman was not the first Ottoman sultan to make this claim. This epithet's usage to describe an Ottoman sultan goes back as early as 1421. For an in-depth analysis of this important issue see Colin Imber, "Süleyman as Caliph of the Muslims: Ebû's-Su'ûd's Formulation of Ottoman Dynastic Ideology" in *Soliman le Magnifique et son temps*, pp. 179-184.

[1] It should also be pointed out here that much recent scholarship has begun questioning the validity and scope of the seventeenth-century "Ottoman decline," and has presented challenging evidence against the classical "decline theory." As examples of such questionings or suggestions see Suraiya Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914,* edited by Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 411-636; Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).

[1] Thanks to Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, we know that this term came into usage through the poem "Lale Devri" (the "Tulip Period") by Yahya Kemal Beyatlı (1884-1958). This observation changes the common notion that Ahmed Refik's *Lale Devri* (1331 [1912]) gave the name to this period of Ottoman history. (See Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, "Nedim'e Dair Bazı Düşünceler" in *Edebiyat Üzerine Makaleler.* İkinci Baskı [İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1977], p. 169.)]

[1] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), p. 51.

[1] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey,* p. 25.

[1] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey.* Second Edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 45.

[1] *The Topkapı Saray Museum: The Albums and Illustrated Manuscripts.* Translated, expanded and edited by J. M. Rogers from the original Turkish by Filiz Çağman and Zeren Tanındı (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), p. 252.

[1] Ahmed Refik, *Lale Devri* (İstanbul: Kitabhane-i Askeri, 1331), pp. 53-54; Sevengil, *İstanbul Nasıl Eğleniyordu,* p. 76.

[1] Sevengil, *İstanbul Nasıl Eğleniyordu,* p. 71.

[1] *Topkapı Saray Museum,* p. 252.

[1] Mélikoff, "Lâle Devri" in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* volume V (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), p. 41.

[1] "In the fourteenth century the Mongol rulers of Persia had printed and issued paper money, in obvious imitation of Chinese models, and at an earlier date the Turkic peoples of the Chinese borderlands had made use of a form of block printing, common in the Far East. But all this had long since been forgotten, and the Ottoman Turks, like other Middle Eastern Muslim peoples, had no knowledge of book printing until it was introduced from Europe" (Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* p. 50).

[1] Niyazi Berkes, "İlk Türk Matbaası Kurucusunun Dinî ve Fikrî Kimliği," *Belleten* XXVI/101-104 (1962), pp. 715-737; Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey,* pp. 36-41; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi.* vol. IV/1, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlarından, III. Seri, No. 16 d1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1956), p. 161; Hüseyin G. Yurdaydın, "Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi" in *Türkiye Tarihi: Osmanlı Devleti (1600-1908)*, vol. 3, Sina Akşin, ed. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1988), pp. 276-278.

[1] "Dignitary responsible for all matters connected with the canon law, religious schools, etc., and coming next to the Grand Vizier in precedence" *Redhouse Yeni Türkçe-İngilizce Sözlük* (İstanbul: Redhouse Press, 1987), 9th Edition, p. 1059.

[1] An Islamic legal pronouncement, a religious ruling.

[1] Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* p. 51.

[1] Evin, Ahmet Ömür. *Nedim: Poet of the Tulip Age: The Beginning of Western Influences and Westernization in Turkey: 1718-1730.* Ph.D. dissertation (New York: Columbia University, 1973), p. 39. The following study outlines well the Ottoman scientific activities of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: Esin Kâhya, "Onsekiz ve Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıllarda Genel Çizgileriyle Osmanlılarda Bilim," *Erdem: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Dergisi* 3/8 (1987), pp. 491-517.

[1] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism,* pp. 27-29.

[1] Ariel Salzmann, "The Age of Tulips: Confluence and Conflict in Early Modern Consumer Culture (1550-1730) in *Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550-1922: An Introduction,* edited by Donald Quataert (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), p. 97.

Unit I Origins of the Ottoman State

Week 1

Reading
Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, 1-54.

Essay Topics
Write three essays discussing Paul Wittek's lectures on the foundation of the Ottoman State:
1. "Criticism of the Tradition and Exposition of the Problem"
2. "Turkish Asia Minor up to the Osmanlis"
3. "From the Emirate of the March-Warriors to the Empire"

Week 2

Readings
Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, 1-50, 51-74, 75-104, 105-114.

Essay Topics
Decades after the historian Wittek shared his much-debated stories regarding the rise of the Ottomans in world history, Rudi Paul Lindner came forward with an original approach to subject and proposed a new hypothesis that "… the Holy War played no role in early Ottoman history, despite the later claims of Muslim propagandists." Discuss the following chapters and explain how Lindner supports his claims:
1. "The Tent of Osman, the House of Osman"
2. "Ottoman Regulations and Nomad Customs"
3. "The Horse Drovers of the Axylon"
4. "Conclusion"

Week 3

Readings
Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*, 29-47, 47-59, 60-90, 90-117.

Essay Topics
In his *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*, Cemal Kafadar argues in support of Lindner's earlier opposition to the so-called Holy War theory. Discuss the following chapters and explain how Kafadar attempts to distinguish the concept of "gaza" from "jihad," and debate whether he successfully supports his ideas with historical and textual evidence:
1. "The Rise of the Ottoman State in Modern Historiography"
2. "The Wittek Thesis and Its Critics"
3. "Gaza and Gazis in the Frontier Narratives of Medieval Anatolia"
4. "The Chronicles of the House of Osman and Their Flavor: Onion or Garlic?"

Week 4

Reading
Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, 15-31, 33-44, 45-54, 55-94.

Essay Topic
The Nature of the Early Ottoman State by Heath W. Lowry is the latest book on the role that the "Holy War" played in the construction of the Ottoman state. Here, Lowry strenuously opposes the "Holy War" approach. Discuss the following chapters and comment on the originality of Lowry's book in comparison to the previous research and publications on the subject. Finally, comment on the weaknesses and strengths of his work:
1. "Wittek Revisited: His Utilization of Ahmedi's *İskendernâme*"
2. "Wittek Revisited: His Utilization of the 1337 Bursa Inscription"
3. "What Could the Terms *Gaza* and *Gazi* Have Meant to the Early Ottomans?"
4. "Toward a New Explanation"

Unit II   From Principality to Empire

Week 5

Readings
Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, 9-16, 17-22, 23-34.
Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition*, 11-29.

Essay Topics
The fourteenth century was the century of ideological formation and development of conquest strategies. Discuss the following chapters by Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*:
1. "From Frontier Principality to Empire, 1354-1402"
2. "The Interregnum and Recovery"
3. "The Definitive Establishment of the Ottoman Empire, 1453-1526"
4. Also discuss Norman Itzkowitz's descriptive summary of the time period.

Unit III   The Ottoman Turks as a World Power

Week 6

Introduction
After the "holy warrior" Mehmed II's death in 1481, eventually the era of Bayezid II (1481-1512) emerged. One of the significant developments during his reign was the growth and strength of the Ottoman navy and this had some important implications for the spread of the "holy war" ideology challenging Venice and Spain. The Sunni "holy wars" reached their peak during the short period of Selim I (Yavuz Sultan Selim, 1512-1520), and the Ottoman state was no longer a regional power in the Balkans and Anatolia but had become a world empire. With the defeat of Shah Ismail at the famed Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, the conquest of Diyarbakir and the defeat of Mamluks at Marj Dabik in 1516, the capture of Egypt in 1517 the Ottomans not only expanded the territory of the empire to a significant degree but also begun to play a major role as the leader of the Sunni world of Islam. Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566) continued his father's legacy of "holy wars" and

territorial expansionism both against the Christian West and the Shiite Muslims in addition to advancing the Ottoman bureaucratic structure.

Readings
Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, 35-40.
Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire: 1300-1650*, 44-66.

Essay Topics
Discuss this period focusing on the following:
1. "The Ottoman State as a World Power, 1526-96"
2. "The Apogee of Empire, 1512-90"

Unit IV   **The "Decline" of the Empire**

Week 7

Readings
Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, 41-52.
Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire: 1300-1650*, 66-86.
Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition*, 63-85.

Essay Topics
1. How does Halil İnalcık describe and define the Ottoman "decline"?
2. Compare İnalcık's approach to that of Imber.
3. Write a descriptive summary of Norman Itzkowitz's chapter entitled "The Post-Suleimanic Age."

Week 8

Readings
Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, 1-134.
Ariel Salzmann, "The Age of Tulips: Confluence and Conflict in Early Modern Consumer Culture (1550-1730)," 83-106.

Essay Topics
1. Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-El-Haj argues that "[t]he prevailing scholarly view of the tanzimat reforms presents major methodological problems. It postulates that the Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century are based on an external (i.e., Western) model, which was imported and superimposed on Ottoman society. The assumption is that somehow the older system of government and social organization had ceased to regenerate and renew itself. Therefore the changes of the nineteenth century are depicted as sudden and new, indeed, unprecedented. The methodological and scientific problems posed by this view should make the historian gravely skeptical. After all, it implies a fundamental improbability: that Ottoman society was static and that a complete change took place within a short period of time, with virtually no preparation or precedent." Discuss how Abou-El-Haj repudiates the theories of "decline." What kind of textual evidence does he present in support of his arguments?

2. Provide a descriptive summary of Ariel Salzmann's "The Age of Tulips: Confluence and Conflict in Early Modern Consumer Culture (1550-1730)."

Unit V   The Ottoman State Institutions and Structure

Week 9

Readings
Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, 59-64, 65-69, 70-75.

Essay Topics
Discuss the following subjects:
1. "The Manner of Accession to the Throne"
2. "The Ottoman Concept of State and the Class System"
3. "Law: Sultanic Law (Kânûn) and Religious Law (Şeriat)"

Week 10

Readings
Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, 76-88, 89-103, 104-118.

Essay Topics
1. "The Palace"
2. "The Central Administration"
3. "The Provincial Administration and the Timar System"

Week 11

Readings
Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire: 1300-1650*, 128-142, 252-286, 287-317.

Essay Topics
Write descriptive summaries of the following sections of Colin Imber's *The Ottoman Empire: 1300-1650*:
1. "Recruitment"
2. "The Army"
3. "The Fleet"

Unit VI   The Political Power of the Ottoman Harem

Week 12

Readings
Leslie P. Pierce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, 15-149.

Discussion
In the next two weeks we will discuss the following sections of Leslie P. Pierce's *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*.
"The Politics of Reproduction"

Week 13

Reading
Leslie P. Pierce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, 153-285.

Discussion
"Women and Sovereign Power"

Unit VII   **Religious and Secular Laws: The Ottoman Way**

Week 14

Reading
Colin Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition*, 3-62, 63-111.

Discussion
In the next two weeks we will discuss the following sections of Colin Imber's *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition.*
"The Historical and Legal Background"
"The Sources of Legal Authority: The Holy Law and the Ottoman Sultan"

Week 15

Reading
Colin Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition*, 113-268, 269-272.

Discussion
"The Law in Detail"
"Conclusion"

Unit VIII   Week 16   **Review, Essay, Exam**